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ABSTRACT

PONTUS VILLEHARD ANDERSSON: How Startups Succeed: A Look at How
Architectural Innovation Provides a Competitive Advantage
(Under the direction of Tony Ammeter)
The recent rise of high profile startups in the news and the prolific attention given to the
entrepreneurial culture during an economic makes understanding how startups work a
point of interest for many. The glamorization of shows like “Silicon Valley” and the
growth of online personalities and their followers makes it even more exciting. But why
do so many startups fail so drastically and a few reach unfathomable heights and why are
household companies so interested in them? This paper addresses one of the underlying
themes that drives business today, specifically, architectural innovation, or how
companies organize. By following the diary of the CEO of a locally successful startup,
this paper draws conclusions on how organizational architecture impacts a startup’s
ability to acquire knowledge that allows it to be competitive.
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I.

Problem

Startups continually create disruptive innovations in industries previously dominated
by large established firms (Christensen, 1997; Lepore, 2014). The narrative is much
always the same. An overwhelming lack of sufficient funding, partnerships, and
resources historically point to a recipe for failure. The new innovative ideas or products
they produce open avenues in existing markets. In this research project, I explore
characteristics about new entrants that gives them a competitive business advantage over
large established firms in developing innovative products, in particular innovations in
organizing (termed ‘architectural innovations’) the structure of the firm. I focus on a
nascent high-technology industry - smart mirrors - and seek to answer the research
question “How does architectural innovation in startups lead to competitive business
advantage over large established firms in the smart mirror market?”
Plenty of new innovations enter the market place every day, yet only a few ever reach
fruition with rates ranging from 47% to 90% depending on the market (Gourville, 2006;
Cierpicki, Wright, Malcolm, & Sharp, 2000). Young firms are habitually not successful,
with success rates ranging from 1 to 25% which makes those who do succeed so much
more intriguing (Cusumano, 2013).
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) have marketed success within the realm
of business. Recent years have seen the returns of billion-dollar venture capital
investments propelling small businesses such as Uber and Pinterest to new heights (Porat,
2015). Disruptions amongst the firms in the tech industry are not new (Downes & Nunes,
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2013). Whether the narrative encompasses news, transportation, or smart technology,
ecosystems are being disrupted and moved in big ways by small companies.
Their ability to make these changes comes with its fair share of challenges. We need
to accept that SMEs are prone to failure. Hundreds of thousands of SMEs fall victim to
the rigors of the economy and their industries, which makes the successes so important to
study. Innovation by small enterprises shapes industries (Christensen, 2012; Clark &
Henderson, 1990). When they succeed, they succeed big. The Ubers, Snapchats, and
Airbnb’s of the world are widely known because they changed their industries.
Additionally, their impact also changes the landscape of our economy (Kalak & Hudson,
2015). Small firms are credited with creating new job opportunities and innovation
regardless of the environment they exist in, which means the survival of these SMEs is
paramount to tapping into their success over the long-term.
Understanding this success starts with understanding the way these firms are
structured. As venture capitalists change their approach from investing in ideas to
investing in teams, it does not make sense to focus predominantly on the products or
ideas these entrants pursue (Cusumano, 2013). Management ideas and structure allow for
movement that is both decisive and responsive (Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013). This
climate is what leads to new avenues or methodologies of development of projects
(Christensen, 2012). Many of the difficulties established firms experience are tied to an
inability to react responsively because they are unaware of how they should react (Velu,
2015) or even if they should react (Christensen 1997). These larger firms keep doing the
right things, acting almost entirely in the same interests as their young competitors, but
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fail when it comes to implementing these new strategies because they lose sight of what
their customers will want as opposed to what the firms wants (Christensen, 1997).

II.

Importance of Research

The rise of new entrants in the marketplace has shifted investments in innovation.
Disruptive companies like Airbnb, DraftKings, Tinder, and Uber have changed the way
their industries think (Rivlin-Nadler, 2016). Their innovation is often unable to be
replicated by established firms and allows them to gain solid entry to the market
(Christensen, 1997). I hypothesize that these new entrants acquire knowledge differently
than established firms. Frequently the focus of innovation rests on the products
themselves which overshadow innovations in the company itself (Gourville, 2006;
Lepore, 2014; Cusumano, 2013). What really determines the success of a startup is its
ability to build sound business practices and plans that set it up for success (Cierpicki,
Wright, Malcolm, & Sharp, 2000; Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013).
Consistently the narrative of investments in innovative technology does not rely on
the technology as the anchor point. Instead, investors look for teams and people who are
capable of executing (Cusumano, 2013). They do this because teams who can execute
strategies outpace teams who worry about creating strategies. An idea without a team will
go nowhere. Therefore, understanding the way that startups develop and execute
strategies and also how they develop management structures would lead to a better
understanding of how to determine why new entrants are able to compete successfully
against established firms.
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III.

Research Model

The complexity behind innovation warrants a closer look. Technical innovation is the
central driver of these firms and is encompassed by two general areas: core concepts and
components. They are fundamental to understanding the framework for defining
innovation (Clark & Henderson, 1990). Core concepts defines our understanding of how
things work. Components refers to the essential parts which are used to create a product.

Figure 1 - Differentiating between different forms of innovation (Clark &
Henderson, 1990)

The most difficult of the four, radical and architectural innovation have the greatest
impact on their respective industries. These kinds of innovation are seldom seen but have
far-reaching impact that typically overturns more than one industry. For this paper, we will
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be focusing on architectural innovation where core concepts are reinforced but the linkage
between them is changed. When we understand how a company forms its business around
a set of components and core concepts we begin to understand how their product or a
service can displace established competitors. The important differentiation to make here is
that the success of the company does not rely on the product itself. Architectural innovation
instead focuses on the company’s understanding of its product as it relates to the market
and competition. Usually it takes root initially in simple applications at the bottom of a
market and then relentlessly moves up (Christensen, 2012). By changing the bottom of the
market small firms can create disruptive products that are so cost affordable and simple
that the market evolves and threatens established firms.
An enterprise’s job is to maximize shareholder wealth. Architectural Innovation
stresses this relationship. Redesigning how a core concept is used or reconfiguring
components to adapt their use case is secondary to ensuring organization structuring is
achieved. Not only are large firms regimented in their ways but they are also generally
unreceptive to new schools of thought. This leads to a complacency wherein an
unwillingness to commit or change the existing thought process leads to one of two
scenarios. First, the large firm is unable to tailor the experience associated with the
product despite being able to manufactured it well. This stems from a hesitance to rewire
and rethink the implications of an innovative method. Or second, they get left behind as
SMEs carry forward with their innovations and disrupt the space. Inevitably, the large
enterprises will attempt to recover their smaller market that has been stolen by the smaller
firms.

Andersson 11

Innovation is not a game of speed or resources; it is a game of evolutions. Large
firms have the resources and connections for both existing and future products. They are
well positioned for the expectation of growth and are capable of initiating conversations
if needed. The acquisition and possession of materials and resources is not what defines
innovation – execution is key. Startups do not have the similar resources on hand that
large enterprises process. Instead desperation drives constant change, pushing the
company forward. Success is too often paralleled with a small firm’s ability to constantly
rethink how they are going to execute strategies instead of determining them.
An understanding of the channels, filters, and strategies (fundamental elements for
planning and executing architectural innovation) employed by the firm allows us to
explore the question of unique knowledge that allows small firms to be successful.
Channels refer to the company’s interactions, formal and informal, that are critical to
its task (Clark & Henderson, 1990). Whether they be multimillion dollar design contracts
or advisors, these resources are vital to the organization. They serve as the backbone for
negotiations and business dealings and set the standard for capacity. These channels have
traditionally separated startups from being able to compete with large firms. The game of
resources has always favored the financially sound giants who set the industry standard.
Only recently have these barriers to entry begun to shift as investor confidence is being
restored (Porat, 2015). This has allowed startups to be competitive with their channels.
While the cost of resources and connections has been a pain point for startups, the
importance of being able to differentiate between relevant and irrelevant channels is a
contended one. Filters fulfill this role as they allow the organization to identify
immediately what is most crucial in its information system (Clark & Henderson, 1990).
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They provide an organizational differentiation between items of relevance and those less
important. By being selective and knowledgeable about the needs and wants for new
projects, firms are able to optimize their filters. Startups have a significant filter
advantage because they are experiencing this innovation from the ground up. Unlike
large firms, startups filter their channels as they grow. Large firms may find their ability
to gather new information constrained by the filters that they have in place and cannot
change, or do not know they need to change. In startups, pertinent filters are formed that
are designed to impact the specific needs of a new product or service. This knowledge
allows new entrants to build a competitive business advantage that is directed and
focused from the ground up.
Strategies dictate the future of a business. Where startups succeed is in their ability to
rewire their strategic thinking. Established firms ask how they can get their channels
filtered to match their strategies. This process is different in startups because they ask
what do they do to get their strategies to channels so they filter them out to find the best
solution. They understand their strategies and how they need to get them to the
appropriate channels; this application occurs when startups apply appropriate filters to
their channels. This knowledge allows startups an advantage because they can focus on
product validation as opposed to product testing. The former validates their company’s
existence because it is well received by their audience while the later serves as proof their
product works.
Understanding how startups are able to form their channels, filters, and strategies
requires an intimate examination from start to finish. As such this paper borrows case
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study research practices from Eisenhardt which features a process that is highly iterative
and tightly linked to data appropriate for new topic areas as seen in Figure 2 (1989).

Figure 2 - Process of building theory from case study research (Eisenhardt, 1989)
To get started it was important to ask questions and research the established firms.
Exploring why it is possible for startups who have seemingly no chance to compete
provides an insight to the challenges they face. It makes the most sense to choose one
company for this as an intimate knowledge and analysis can provide a template for future
research. On The Wall, Inc. was chosen because it has been well documented since its
inception and had no preexisting structure.
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The instruments and protocols came in the form of a qualitative analysis of a one year
diary kept on the company’s decisions and meetings, both internally and externally.
Examining the field occurred as overlap amongst the diary pages came forth and different
business elements surfaced notably: Hardware, software, marketing, finance, legal,
venture capital, equity, management, mentorship, partnerships, Kickstarter, and
prototyping. Qualitative analysis of these elements makes the most sense because it opens
the way to interpret and understand the logic behind the writer of the notes (Eisenhardt,
1989). By examining the channels, filters, and strategies startups employ with their
businesses can we begin to understand how their changing architectural innovation leads
them to knowledge that allows them a competitive business advantage.
I use the case study of my company On The Wall, Inc., a startup in the smart mirror
business, coupled with research on architectural innovation to explore how the channels,
filters, and strategies that a startup employs may result in patterns of thinking that lead
startups to gain a competitive business advantage. My research question, therefore, is
“How does architectural innovation in startups lead to competitive business advantage
over large established firms in the smart mirror market?”

IV.

Propositions

Through the research gathered from On The Wall, Inc. this paper seeks to support the
early formation of channels, filters, and strategies. Startups in innovative sectors begin
with no or very few of these elements and thus develop them differently than established
companies. This influences the way they grow and supports the idea architectural
innovation provides new entrants a competitive business advantage.
Andersson 15

P1: Channels form differently in startups than they do in established

companies.
a) Startups do not have vast resources they can draw from initially.
b) Resources come from the interactions the company has with
outside influences where they are operating from a position of
lesser value.
P2: Themes appear in channel blocks for startups as they focus on

channel development.
a) Channels tend to be very focused in groups. These themes are
transitioned to filters and strategies to allow the startup to move
to establishing new channels.
b) Startups determine the level of importance of channels quickly
and those which add little value are either transitioned out or
adapted as filters.
P3: Filters are important because they cause companies to focus their

channels.
a) As startups grow they strategically design their filters to reflect
their channels positively.
b) Filters are relatively unused in startups because they impeded
architectural innovation more than they help.
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P4: Filters appear less frequently in startup architecture. Startups focus

their development on channels as they grow and do not close off
their resources permanently.
a) Themes in startups develop time sensitive filters.
b) Filters become less frequent as the organization’s strategies
become more defined.
P5: Strategies are how companies take advantage of their channels.

Startups develop their strategies differently from established firms.
a) The limited channels startups begin with forces them to develop
strategies without resources.
b) Strategies without the restrictions of available resources allows
startups to explore non-traditional channels.
P6: Themes, while present in a startup’s strategies, are much more

scattered than their counterparts.
a) If startups form their strategies based on the channels they have
they are unable to move forward at an accelerated pace.
b) Startups become more refined with their strategies as they
become developed.
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V.

Research Approach

This research paper will observe the developments of small enterprise called On The
Wall, Inc. which is a smart mirror company incorporated in and based out of Oxford, MS.
The company shows key performance indicators which point toward architectural
innovation within their field. Currently no major company is working on smart mirror
technology and as such the market does exist but is largely undeveloped and under
explored. Having raised $200,000 in capital the company shares milestones many other
successful startups possess.
The research portion of this paper will center around information gathered by the
company’s chief executive officer. Given the nature of being a startup it is assumed that
the CEO is intimately involved with most every decision made by the business. This is an
important distinction to make about the information because it will contain multiple
interwoven channels, filters, and strategies. Because of this it stands to reason that amidst
the day to day operations of the company, time is spent by upper level management
sorting and adapting information to fit each of the three and as a result forming the
beginnings of the company’s history of channels, filters, and strategies.
The information will be gathered and kept in the form of a diary used as a record of
the day-to-day meetings the CEO engages in with both internal and external persons
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 2008). These interactions will form the qualitative
research of the paper and serve as the backbones to determine how linkages in the
company’s architecture evolve.
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The procedure for analyzing the diary was as follow. First, each line was separated
into its respective focus. This was aided by assigning certain key elements colors to
create a colorized summary of those elements. Furthermore, inputting the data into a
searchable schematic allowed for keywords, channels, filters, strategies, and internal and
external points to be highlighted to further draw attention to the metadata associated with
each memo. Special notes were kept for external correspondences to denote the
difference in communication and openness. Accordingly, internal meetings revolved
around weekly meetings designed to serve as updates as well as checkmarks for progress
made between meetings.
Documentation of the software and hardware development cycle was overlooked for
the purposes of this paper in exchange for more detail on the executive and managerial
oversight associated with it. In this regard, the nature of the paper distinguished itself
from being product focused and examined the architectural innovation associated with
starting a technology startup in an unexplored space. This is different because it provided
a unique perspective on the creation of a company that is specifically situated around a
single product line.

VI.

Discussion

Startups inherently exist in a state of disadvantages. From conception to their IPO
or purchase there is consistent work against established businesses to distinguish
themselves and survive. Because of this narrative of struggle that is so consistent
throughout startup stories when these new firms do succeed, often at magnitudes
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greater than their established counterparts, there is an intense interest in
understanding why.
With On The Wall, Inc. the story remains much the same. Limited resources
dominated the picture from the very start.

Table 1 - Available resources
Resource

Tangible/Intangible

Theme

Available from
Start

Personal Investments

Tangible

Financials

Yes

Smart home experience

Intangible

Software

Yes

Entrepreneurship experience

Intangible

Business

Yes

Development tools

Tangible

Software

Yes

Local business connections

Intangible

Business

Yes

totaling ~$30,000.00

A mixture of tangible and intangible resources composed much of the first 6-8
months of the venture. Experienced founders grew the vision of the company from the
start taking advantage of the few tangible resources that they did have. These provided
the foundation for the channels which would provide the initial decisions that would
begin to shape the direction of the Company.
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Figure 3 - Channel developments to strategy
The channels which the Company created stemmed from the external
relationships it had managed to form with its limited resources. As those channels
became more diversified it became necessary to filter those channels and revisit them as
necessary, keeping the limited resources honed on the immediate tasks required to
maintain relevancy. Unlike established firms where channels already exist startups
require to some degree a mixture of search and rescue: search, as in find channels and
access them, and rescue, as in save the most important ones for the start without losing
track of the ones that have been captured.
It is this methodology which provides startups with an architectural advantage
over established firms. By starting from scratch, they are able to strategically spend time
searching and acquiring channels which are specific to their needs. Established firms
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instead spend this time dividing and strategizing which resources they can and/or have to
use. There is a lack of freedom that limits the reactivity of the management in these firms.
As these channels become filtered they are redesigned to accompany an evolution
of strategy in these startups. This becomes obvious within On The Wall as it developed
its legal strategy.

Figure 4 - External legal development
Above, the decision to discuss the provisional patent application filing with an
external source, David Sawrie, became a filter for the Company. To acquire value for the
Company, focus on creating a competitive advantage through intellectual property
changed the strategy for value creation. The channel became the means to capture that
value and filters were put in place to ensure that it was prioritized over other business
decisions.
We see this channel prioritization again within the Company as it filters its legal
structure to focus on agreements and classifications.
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Figure 5 - Internal legal development
These internal channels become focused on moving value and other strategies forward.
Ownership and contract developments displayed in Figure 5 impacted strategies
throughout the Company. As the channels are filtered and updated they begin to reflect
new strategies such as investor relations, hiring agreements, and external relationships.
In startups like On The Wall these channels are essential in developing the
company’s architecture. Because there is no pre-established way of engaging channels, in
part because those channels do not yet exist, there is little confusion as to what new
channels are hired to do. Channels which are confusing or add little value are transitioned
or filtered to new channels to further influence the company’s strategies.
One interesting effect of this innovation is that channels in startups appear in
groups associated with themes. As these themes transition through channels to filters and
are incorporated into strategies they provide new movement throughout the organization.
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Table 2 - Themes in channels, themes for On The Wall, Inc. include law, equity/salary,
and financials.
Date

Themes

Notes

2/17/16

Law

-

4/20/16

Law

-

4/27/16

Equity/Salary

-

5/5/16

Equity/Salary

-

5/20/16
6/14/16
6/14/16

Equity/Salary
Equity/Salary
Financials

-

6/16/16

Financials

-

6/16/16

Marketing/Website

-

6/16/16

Financials

-

Talk with David and his OS guy about going
the open source route and licensing
Follow-up meeting with UM law, discussions
about separating businesses
Talk with Sam about equity distribution
amongst initial contractors (brief)
Equity distribution talk again this time focused
on difference between OTW and O2E
First talk about Alex consulting
Question about hiring Alex
Farris works on pre-order costs +parts with
Alex and developing a strategic accounting
plan
Met with Farris to discuss what accounting
software we were going to use
Work with Georgia on marketing and
predictions
Accounting goals

This theme grouping throughout the formation of channels for the Company
indicate that there is a level of focus that dictates the importance of the strategies they
compliment. While established firms may have more experience with managing themes
as they appear, what separates startups is their awareness of how to prioritize the limited
resources they have. In doing so they create a strategic advantage regarding their overall
goals which allow them to move quickly and precisely from theme to theme. This
specificity is the key to distinguishing the importance of various channels to overall
company strategies.
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Table 3 - Themes in channels cont. include relationships
Date
10/25/16

Themes
Law

-

11/3/16

Relationship

-

11/8/16
11/23/16

Law
Financials

-

11/23/16
11/29/16

Relationship
Relationship

-

11/29/16

Marketing/Website

-

11/30/16
11/30/16

Prototype
Marketing/Website

-

12/2/16

Competitions

12/8/16

Relationship

-

12/8/16

Relationship

-

12/8/16

Relationship

-

Notes
Got a message from Danny about the
agreement
Email NunoErin and bcc Joyce – suggestions
w/ red line
Changes made clear that Alex is a separate
party
Business opportunity agreed upon
$100K VC, 110 corporate partners, don’t take
equity, pre-seed to a VC, no need to be on
site, business development, 100-150
companies selected, Perseus mirrors is in
their current batch
Sam’s illnesses affecting timeline
Advice on financials on how to explain it to
another business person
Look for someone to manage an IT project
NunoErin – progress/timeline on the project
they gave us, what are we doing with them
Conversation with Georgia about design
experience
Alex’s work for hire – CAD drawings
Alex’s work for hire – website
contribution/app presentation, content
contribution/creation
Carolina Crews – Times AR/VR Top 100
Mark – advisory board recommendations
Call with Georgia setting her up with a
marketing advisor
Call with Farris setting him up with a CPA
advisor
Drive over and meet Carolina – Time
Magazine’s AR/VR woman

The aforementioned channels and the strategies which resulted from their
development led the way to new channels which helped prolong the life of the Company.
Specifically, we see that there is a new theme which dominates the later part of the year
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which was not present at the beginning. The inclusion of new partnerships and
relationships later is a continuation of the channels from the beginning of the year.
Similar to the channel definition the Company enjoyed relative to its competitors this
freedom to pick and choose partners is another benefit shared by startup architecture that
is not present in established firms whose commitments to existing partners jeopardizes
this freedom.
As startups grow they strategically design their filters to reflect their channels
positively. In doing so they are very selective in their implementation.

Table 4 - Selective filter implementation
Date
1/4/16

Filters
ReflektOS

-

1/27/16

Law

-

2/17/16

Competitions

-

4/20/16

Law

-

5/20/16

Law

-

6/14/16

Kickstarter

-

6/14/16

Marketing/Website

-

Notes
REST architecture being
scalable/cheap
Meeting with UM law
students about owners of
company and taxes
Plan to submit for the
competition if possible
despite two paths
Filing LLC, operating
agreements, contract
agreements, decision for no
employee agreements
Business documents
needed
Mandatory 8 weeks of
planning for Kickstarter,
shooting for 60%
Have Alex work on front
end web design with Reid
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As was the case for On The Wall, filters were not frequently implemented in the first six
months. When they were, they were the result of the channel evolution previously
discussed. These filters served to help the Company focus on its channels.
Filters remain relatively unused in startups, however, because they impede
architectural innovation more than they help. As strategies become more dominant and
established and the search for channels takes over the narrative for the CEO filters fall to
the wayside. A logical explanation for this is that as the startup becomes better equipped
to implement channels the need for filters cease to become an overarching architectural
concern and start to see a rise in departments and individuals. On The Wall saw this
move. Later adaptations of filters slipped away from overarching strategies and were
applied to individuals. Individuals fulfilling marketing, financial, and product design
work were tasked with jobs to work towards their department’s specific goal. Marketing
was filtered to benefit the Kickstarter, see Table 5. Financing was limited to tax
preparation and budget tasks, while product design was tasked with external relations
related to finishing the prototype, see Table 6.
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Table 5 - Limitations of filters, Kickstarter
Date
8/23/16

Filters
Kickstarter

-

8/26/16

Notes
Basic questions, standout project, rewards,
funds, promotion, communicating with backers,
fulfillment, Perseus Mirrors Kickstarter
campaign, PanL, Adept, Smart Mirror, DoodleVU,
Senic
, campaign timeline, campaign promotion,
campaign materials, campaign page, the
campaign
(empty)

8/29/16

(empty)

9/1/16

(empty)

9/8/16

(empty)

9/11/16

(empty)

10/20/16

(empty)

10/25/16

(empty)

11/3/16

(empty)

11/8/16

(empty)

11/11/16

(empty)

Table 6 - Limitations of filters, product design
Date
12/23/16

Filters
Prototype

-

1/23/16

Kickstarter

-

1/10/17

Notes
Alex – meeting with NunoErin 1/3, 1/10,
1/17, case ready for printing 1/18, printed
case 1/19, finish iterations of case 1/26,
metal version of case 1/31

Film Kickstarter 2/1 – 2/15, launch Kickstarter
2/15
(empty)
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1/13/17

(empty)

1/19/17

(empty)

1/20/17

Law

-

Joyce legal release for content/interviews

1/25/17

(empty)

1/27/17

(empty)

2/1/17

(empty)

Filters for this reason become much more time sensitive for startups as time
progresses. Whereas firms with track records are capable of filtering their productivity
and strategies from the beginning, this becomes a learned skill throughout the company’s
architecture as the new firm matures. During this maturation, the organization’s strategies
become much more defined and filters are applied to departments and individuals and
away from the overarching strategies of the company.
The limited channels startups begin with are impetuses for them to begin
developing strategies to capitalize on resource acquisition, often with multiple strategies
in mind. On The Wall, Inc. recognized its lack of resources from early on and made
efforts to maximize its ability to acquire new channels.

Table 7 - A strategic start to capitalize on future opportunties
Date
1/4/16

Strategies
Marketing/Website

-

1/9/16

Competitions

-

Notes
Business cards for future meetings

Discussion about presenting business
for CIE competition
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1/28/16

Competitions

-

Continued development for the
business competition

2/8/16

Marketing/Website

-

Logo design, first OTW design

These strategies lined up On The Wall for expanding into channels which
provided value to them. From business meetings and future competitions to establishing a
consistent image, both online and offline, these initial strategies focused on innovating
channel creation. Unlike established firms whose strategies will revolve around
expanding or implementing existing channels into new innovations, every strategy for
startups is designed with the new company in mind from the ground up.
This limitation also lends itself to startups exploring non-traditional channels to
expand their resource pool. On The Wall looks to explore Kickstarter, an online
crowdfunding platform, to capitalize on marketing and exposure that it would not have
access to without large funds of capital to spend on marketing, surveys, and production
runs.

Table 8 - Kickstarter strategy
Date
2/17/16

Strategies
Kickstarter

-

5/20/16

Kickstarter

-

Notes
Talks about launching a Kickstarter
led to discussions about creating a
prototype
Discussions about a makeup mirror
for Kickstarter
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These non-traditional platforms require a different architecture than what
established firms are used to. As such new entrants are often more aware of these
platforms than their counterparts and use them much more frequently to unlock channels
they would otherwise be foreign to from their starts. Because of this they develop their
strategies to reflect goals and opportunities which are relevant to taking advantage of
these channels.
Another feature of the way that startups develop their strategies is that they are
often constructed with the understanding that the channels will come later. The limited
resource approach forces startups to develop strategies that are acutely aware of their
absence. A result of this is that they create new strategies or design filters to ensure that
those channels are fulfilled. For On the Wall, Inc. examples of these strategies can be
found in Table 9 where plans for Kickstarter and sales have already been implemented
without a physical prototype or operating system to distribute. This led them to pursue
avenues to expedite the production process and filter the work done by individuals to
capture the most important channels necessary to fulfill these strategies.

Table 9 - Strategies that lack channels
Date
6/14/16

Strategies
Marketing/Website

6/14/16
6/14/16

Marketing/Website
Kickstarter

6/14/16

Prototype

6/14/16
6/14/16

Financials
Prototype

Notes
- Start prefacing Georgia to work on
marketing strategy for NotisMe
- Reid works on both websites
- Plan for the Kickstarter is to have a
makeup mirror for sale for $300-400
- By summer have a prototype finished
to show off to investors
- Aim to raise $100K + VC with video
- Have a demo done by mid-July
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6/14/16

Prototype

-

Prototyping firm said they can make
the first makeup mirror for $50-75K

Yet as these strategies became more refined and focused their structure seemed to
dissipate. On The Wall, as it became more developed from a managerial perspective,
implemented more strategies to deal with its growing pains. The CEO observed these
changes through the legal portion of the company.

Table 10 - Shift in legal strategies
Date
6/19/16

Strategies
Law

6/21/16

Law

Notes
- All work is work for
hire, everything
produced is owned
by On The Wall
- Open source MIT
license code for On
The Wall

As the company grew the strategies corresponding with work for hire, production, and
licensing became much more scattered. What had previously only been a strategy focused
on acquiring a patent and structuring a business was now transformed to focus on solving
the branches which grew from those solutions but also the continuation of the other
strategies which had been adopted by the other individuals working for the Company.
The Company shows a fluidity here that aptly deals with the architectural finesse required
for consistent growth. The pivots occur naturally throughout firm growth but the
difference here is that new entrants are able to use the knowledge they learn along the
way to tailor their organizational responses to hone the company towards its end goal.

Andersson 32

VII.

Limitations

This research paper experienced a couple of limitations which would be of interest to
consider further. Given the brevity of the research and the timeframe proposed there was
no possible way for the researchers to follow the growth of On The Wall, Inc. through to
its end. However, this is the nature of working with a startup from its inception. For this
reason, it would be beneficial for future readers to conduct their own research on the
Company and compare the current state of On The Wall, Inc. to what is presented here in
this paper.
Furthermore, this paper conducts itself solely from the view of the CEO of the On
The Wall team. As is the case with this it must be assumed that his literature is biased and
recollected of his own perspective and not that of the rest of the team. This presented a
unique, unblemished insight into his thoughts and decisions for the company. Future
researchers on this topic would do well to collect more diaries which would inevitably
produce more views and hopefully a better insight to the channels, filters, and strategies
prevalent throughout the entire organization.
Another noted limitation of this research is the nature of the work and focus the CEO
put into the diary and the Company. That is to say that the CEO at the time of this
research was pursuing work with On The Wall in his free time outside of a part-time job
and a full-time course load. Similarities with these time constraints exist amongst many
startups and add to the novelty of following a startup’s CEO. This may have effects on
the ability to manage the individuals of the team as well as focus on multiple strategies at
once akin to the work a full-time employee might be able to.
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An interesting note for future researchers interested in pursuing the topic of startups
and the architecture that arises throughout their growth period is the young nature of the
startups. The average age of the On The Wall team was 21 at the time this research was
collected. It is safe to assume that there was a lack of work force experience which would
be attributed to work done at established firms for lengths lasting longer than one year. In
part this is what made examining On The Wall interesting as the architecture and
decisions which were made were crafted in the middle of learning and often from
intuition as well, however, this knowledge acquisition is part of most narratives of
startups. I do not think that it detracts from the validity of this research merely poses an
interesting question as to whether age or industry experience affects the knowledge which
is able to be capture by startups.

VIII.

Conclusions

In conclusion, I have provided an illustration of the mechanisms of architectural
innovation that lead to knowledge that allows new entrants a competitive business
advantage. The advantages that established companies have is superior, but the
complexity it creates in the innovation process provides an opportunity for new entrants
to surface and be competitive.
Where new entrants struggle to gain access to channels which are closed to them they
gain a tactical advantage in the freedom of choice and strategy to pursue the most
immediate benefactor. Established firms are often bound to existing partners and
relationships which hinders their ability to freely do business and the limitations
associated with doing business elsewhere or even in a different way impacts their ability
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to be reactive and innovative in a new industry that expects its competitors to be exactly
that, but there are benefits. These partners often carry with them exclusive deals and
developed relationships which account for rapid movement and profitable industry
connections.
When new firms are able to quickly change the way they innovate and manage
themselves they are able to consistently handle new problems quickly and efficiently
allowing them to accelerate throw the learning phases associated with growing in an
industry, existing or new.
New entrants’ ability, then, to filter their channels and strategies is somewhat
unprecedented. Filters do not particularly exist because these startups need to be open to
everything at a moment’s notice. As an alternative, these firms adopt strategies
throughout their organization to act as filters in place of traditional filters. This allows
individuals to focus their work without limiting it to specific channels or strategies where
established firms will set filters on work, relationships, and individuals. This relationship
between a strategy that guides versus a strategy that constrains sits at the core of the
strategic direction all firms take.
Definitively the greatest strength that these new entrants have is their ability to be
reactive. As they grow their ability to be reactive increases but also becomes at risk for
being overwhelmed by filters and strategies that attempt to quell the organizations ability
to be reactive. By taking advantage of their unique architecture they can respond and
move about their industry much faster than their competitors and it is this knowledge of
how to move and how to be a new entrant that gives them their competitive business
advantage.
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